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2008(3) Supreme 37
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.N. Agrawal & G.S. Singhvi, JJ.
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. — Petitioners
versus
Union of India & Another — Respondents
Appeal (civil) 1897 of 2003
Decided on : 16-04-2008
(B) Constitution of India — Article 14 — Equal protection of law — Doctrine of equality means that there should be no discrimination between one person and another, if having regard to subject-matter of legislation, their position is the same — State can not discriminate between similarly situated persons — However, constitutional code of equality and equal opportunity does not mean that same laws must be applicable to all persons — Theory of reasonable classification has been invoked in large number of cases for repelling challenge to the constitutionality of different legislations. (Paras 14 and 16)
(C) Constitution of India — Section 14 (1)(e) — Constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(e) on the touchstone of Art. 14 of Constitution — Section 14(1)(e) is violative of doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14 insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bonafide by landlord for occupation of himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only — There are no special rights attached to tenancies of non residential buildings as against tenancies of residential buildings — Scheme of 1958 Act does not make any substantial distinction between residential and non-residential premises — Discrimination which was latent in Section 14 (1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time, become so pronounced that the impugned provision can not be treated intra vires Art. 14 by applying any rational criteria — However, Section 14 (1)(e) is not unconstitutional in its entirety — Ends of justice will be met by striking down discriminating portion of Section 14 (1)(e) — Impugned judgment set aside and Section 14 (1)(e) partly struck down. (Paras 28, 38, 39 and 40)
(D) Statute Law — Reasonableness of legislations — Legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of doctrine of equality — Even if validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that rationale of classification has become non-existent — If offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible. (Paras 29 and 39)
(1986) 4 SCC 736 — Explained.
AIR 1958 SC 538; (1975)3 SCC 76; AIR 1957 SC 628; (1996)1 SCC 1; (1986)3 SCC 385; (1987)4 SCC 238; (1998)2 SCC 1; (2005)8 SCC 504; (1979)1 SCC 380; (2002)3 SCC 533; (1998)8 SCC 275, (2002)5 SCC 397; (1995)5 SCC 482; (2006)2 SCC 724; 1999(1) RLR 689; AIR 1964 SC 1179, 1590; (1979)4 SCC 642; AIR 1966 AP 51; (1975)1 SCC 770; (1981)3 SCC 103; (1996)3 SCC 105 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; (1985) 2 SCC 683; (1984) 1 SCC 222 — Referred.
Facts of the case :
1. Eviction suit filed by petitioner against non-residential tenant on the ground of bonafide personal requirement as well as violation of conditions of lease.
2. Eviction suit dismissed by courts below on the ground that Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is not applicable to non-residential tenants.
3. Full Bench of Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by petitioner by order under challenge in instant appeal.
4. Elaborate projection of genesis and evolution of different rent legislations made by the Bench.
Findings of the Court :
Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is partly violative of Art. 14 of Constitution of India.
Result : Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT
G.S. Singhvi, J. —
1. Whether Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘the 1958 Act’) is ultra vires the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is the question which arises for determination in these appeals.
2. For the sake of convenience, we have noted the facts from Civil Appeal No.1897 of 2003:
(i) On August 18, 1953, Delhi Improvement Trust leased out a plot of land measuring 184 sq. yards situated at Basti Reghar, Block ‘R’, Khasra Nos. 2942/1820 to 2943/1820 to Shri Jagat Singh son of Pt. Ram Kishan. In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of breach of this condition, the lease shall become void.
(ii) After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively.
(iii) Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No. 3395-3397, Ward No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal heirs of the lessee.
(iv) After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease and, therefore, they are liable to be evicted.
(v) The tenants contested the eviction petitions by asserting that the so called need of the landlord was not bona fide; that there were no valid grounds for permitting the landlord to demolish the building and reconstruct the same and that they had not violated the conditions of lease. They further pleaded that the previous owner let out the premises for non-residential purposes; that the appellant was also issuing rent receipts by describing the rented portions as shop/clinic and that in view of order dated 11.12.1978 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Delhi Development Authority was condoning violations of the lease conditions.
(vi) By an order dated 17.5.1991, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissed the eviction petitions. He held that the appellant is owner and landlady of the suit premises, but she has not been able to prove that portions thereof were let for residential purposes; that the appellant and her dependent family members do not have suitable alternative accommodation except the one occupied by her elder son, who was under the threat of eviction and that the need of the appellant is bona fide. The Additional Rent Controller further held that the tenants are guilty of violating clause 4(c) of deed dated August 18, 1953. He, however, declined to pass order for recovery of possession by observing that under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, such an order can be passed only in respect of premises let for residential purposes. The Additional Rent Controller also rejected other grounds of eviction put forward by the appellant.
3. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi vide its judgment dated 10.11.1998. The Tribunal agreed with the Additional Rent Controller that an order of eviction of the tenant can be passed under Section 14(1)(e) only if the premises were let for residential purposes. The Tribunal then held that the portions given to the tenants were being used for non-residential purposes and, therefore, they cannot be evicted on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord.
4. The appellant challenged the orders of the Additional Rent Controlle
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