The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between a discharge simplicitor and a punitive discharge of a probationer, emphasizing the need for an inquiry in cases involving allegations of misconduct or inefficiency.

1. - The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 11.7.98 (Annx. 5), by which petitioner has been discharged from service during the period of probation.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that after holding regular selection for the post of Hostel Superintendent, petitioner was appointed, vide order dated 29.6.96, on probation for a period of one year and he joined the service on 13.7.96. The probation period was further extended for a period of one year, however, petitioner has been discharged vide order dated 11.7.98 as his services were not found satisfactory. Hence this petition.

3. Mr. G.K. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order has been passed as a punishment and is stagmatic and, thus, bad in law.

4. Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has pointed out that there is nothing in the impugned order which can be termed to be stagmatic; it only speaks of warning and counselling which certainly did not cast stigma. It is a case of discharge of probationer simplicitor and the inquiry, as contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution or any provision analogous to the same was not required.

5. The sole point involved in this case is whether such an order casts stigma and if yes, whether it could have been passed without holding inquiry ?

6. The issue involved herein has been considered by the courts time and again. In Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India & ors., AIR 1958 SC 36 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that appointment even to a permanent post on probation means that the employee was taken on trial and such an appointment comes to an end even during or at the end of the probation if the person so appointed is found to be unsuited and his services to are terminated.

7. In State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 689 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that if the employer proceeded against a probationer; directly without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not, in law, have the effect of removal from service by way of punishment and he, therefore, cannot have any grievance but in case the employer has branded the employee as dishonest and an incompetent officer, the probationer was entitled for protection of the rights under Article 311 of the Constitution of India.

8. Another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 , held that if the order of discharge made it clear that it was discharge "for unsatisfactory work and conduct," the language used therein did not cast stigma and it was merely an order of discharge simplicitor. The order of discharge of the probationer was found to be valid in law though in the said case, a preliminary enquiry had been held before discharging him from service.

9. In State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the procedure adopted by the employer wherein the disciplinary enquiry was dropped in the mid way and order of reversion was passed. The Apex Court held that the circumstances proceeding the order of reversion, must be examined in each case, the motive behind being immaterial. Thus, it is open for the employer to drop the proceedings in the mid way and pass the order of discharge simplicitor if he is not willing to ascertain the correctness of allegations made against the probationer.

10. In Union of India & ors. v. R.S. Dhaba, (1969) 3 SCC 603 ; State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Misra, AIR 1971 SC 1011 ; and R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. & ors., AIR 1974 SC 1317 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in such a case, the Court has to examine whether the misconduct or negligence on the part of the employee was a mere motive for the order of termination or discharge or it was the very foundation of that order. The form of the order was not conclusive of its true natu