JUDGMENT

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. The pivotal issue that emanates for consideration in these appeals, by special leave, pertains to interpretation of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, "the POCSO Act"), and the primary argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the definition in Section 2(d) that defines "child" to mean any person below the age of 18 years, should engulf and embrace, in its connotative expanse, the "mental age" of a person or the age determined by the prevalent science pertaining to psychiatry so that a mentally retarded person or an extremely intellectually challenged person who even has crossed the biological age of 18 years can be included within the holistic conception of the term "child".

3. Before I note the submissions of Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel for the appellant, the supporting submissions by the respondent State and the proponements in oppugnation by the learned senior counsel who was engaged on behalf of the accused-respondent No. 2 by the Court as the said respondent chose not to enter appearance, few facts are essential to be noted. The appellant is represented by her mo