Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Ms Karuna Nundy with Mr Mukesh Sharma and Mr Raghav Awasthy, Advs.
For the UOI : Mr Tushar Mehta, SG and Mr Chetan Sharma, ASG with Ms Monika Arora, CGSC along with Mr Vinay Yadav, Mr Amit Gupta, Mr Akshya Gadeock, Mr Rishav Dubey, Mr Rajat Nair, Mr Sahaj Garg and Mr R.V. Prabhat, Advs.
For the Respondent:Mr Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Advocate/Amicus Curiae with Mr Karthik Sundar, Ms Mansi Sood and Ms Sonal Sarda, Ms Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. As Amicus Curiae with Mr Harsh Bora, Ms Praavita Kashyap, Mr Chinmay Kanojia, Mr Pravir Singh and Ms Adya R. Luthra, Mr Amit Lakhani and Mr Ritwik Bisaria as Intervenors, Men’s Welfare Trust.
For the Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5858/2017 & CM No. 45279/2021: Mr Colin Gonsalves, Sr. Adv. With Ms. Olivia Bang, Ms Sneha Mukherjee, Ms Mugdha and Ms Aimy Shukla, Advs.
For the UOI in W.P.(C) 5858/2017 & CM No. 45279/2021 :Mr Ruchir Mishra, Mr Sanjiv Kumar Saxena, Mr Mukesh Kumar Tiwari and Mr Ramneek Mishra, Mr Gautam Narayan, ASC, GNCTD with Ms Nikita Pancholi, Adv. Mr Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Advocate/Amicus Curiae with Mr Karthik Sundar, Ms Mansi Sood and Ms Sonal Sarda, Advocates.
For the Applicant in CM 19948/2016 :Ms Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. As Amicus Curiae with Mr Harsh Bora, Ms Praavita Kashyap, Mr Chinmay Kanojia, Mr Pravir Singh and Ms Adya R. Luthra, Advs. Mr R.K. Kapoor, Advocate.
For the Petitioner in W.P.(C) 6024/2017:Ms Karuna Nundy, Ms Ruchira Goel, Mr Rahul Narayan, Mr Nitish Chaudhary, Ms Ragini Nagpal, Ms Muskan Tibrewala, Mr Utsav Mukherjee and Mr Shashwat Goel, Mr Chetan Sharma, ASG with Mr Anil Soni, CGSC along with Mr Devesh Dubey, Mr Vinay Yadav, Mr Amit Gupta, Mr Akshya Gadeock, Mr Rishav Dubey, Mr Sahaj Garg and Mr R.V. Prabhat, Mr Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Advocate/Amicus Curiae with Mr Karthik Sundar, Ms Mansi Sood and Ms Sonal Sarda, Ms Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. As Amicus Curiae with Mr Harsh Bora, Ms Praavita Kashyap, Mr Chinmay Kanojia, Mr Pravir Singh and Ms Adya R. Luthra, Advs.
For the Petitioner in W.P.(CRL) 964/2017:Mr Sahil Malik, Ms Nandita Rao, ASC for State. Mr Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Advocate/Amicus Curiae with Mr Karthik Sundar, Ms Mansi Sood and Ms Sonal Sarda, Advocates, Ms Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. As Amicus Curiae with Mr Harsh Bora, Ms Praavita Kashyap, Mr Chinmay Kanojia, Mr Pravir Singh and Ms Adya R. Luthra, Advs.

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

1. The legal challenge primarily concerns the constitutionality of Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC (commonly referred to as the Marital Rape Exception - MRE) and Section 376B of the IPC, along with Section 198B of the CrPC, which collectively provide certain immunities to husbands and separated husbands in cases of sexual violence within marriage (!) (!) .

2. The core issue is whether these provisions violate fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(a), and 21 of the Constitution, by creating unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory classifications based on marital status, and by denying women their bodily autonomy and sexual agency (!) (!) .

3. The historical context reveals that these provisions are rooted in outdated notions of marriage and implied consent, originating from colonial-era doctrines that treated women as property of their husbands, which are incompatible with modern constitutional values of equality and individual rights (!) (!) .

4. There is a significant argument that the retention of MRE perpetuates gender stereotypes and discriminates against married women by denying them the same protections against non-consensual sexual acts as are available to unmarried women or women in other relationships (!) (!) .

5. The provisions are also challenged on the ground that they violate Articles 21 and 15 by infringing on women’s rights to dignity, bodily integrity, and freedom from gender-based violence, including marital rape, which is increasingly recognized globally as a serious crime (!) (!) .

6. The law’s classification based on marital status is deemed unreasonable and arbitrary, lacking a rational nexus with the legislative objective of protecting women from sexual violence, thus failing the test of constitutional reasonableness under Articles 14 and 15 (!) (!) .

7. The argument that existing legal remedies (such as civil and other criminal provisions) suffice to address non-consensual acts is rejected, emphasizing that these do not explicitly recognize or criminalize marital rape, thereby leaving a significant gap in protection (!) (!) .

8. The international conventions and covenants, such as CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration, support the view that violence against women, including marital rape, should be recognized as a violation of human rights, and that laws should evolve to reflect contemporary understandings of gender equality and bodily autonomy (!) (!) .

9. The legal history demonstrates that the doctrine of implied consent within marriage has been progressively dismantled in many jurisdictions, recognizing that marriage does not imply perpetual consent to sexual acts, and that non-consensual sex constitutes a violation of fundamental rights (!) (!) .

10. The provisions under challenge are found to violate constitutional principles of equality, dignity, autonomy, and freedom, and their retention is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate to uphold individual rights and prevent gender-based violence (!) (!) .

11. The court concludes that the impugned provisions, which grant immunity to husbands for non-consensual sexual acts within marriage, are unconstitutional and are accordingly struck down, effective from the date of the judgment (!) .

12. The decision emphasizes that the legislature, not the judiciary, is responsible for framing laws and policy, but courts are empowered and obliged to strike down unconstitutional laws to protect fundamental rights (!) (!) .

13. The court recognizes the importance of social change and the need for legislative reform to address issues related to gender equality, consent, and sexual autonomy, but maintains that constitutional protections cannot be deferred or limited by policy considerations or traditional norms (!) (!) .

14. The ruling affirms that the constitutional mandate to eliminate discrimination and uphold individual rights includes the removal of outdated legal exemptions that are inconsistent with modern constitutional values (!) (!) .

15. The judgment underscores the importance of aligning laws with international standards and conventions that recognize violence against women, including marital rape, as a serious violation of human rights (!) (!) .

These points collectively reflect the court’s reasoning that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional, discriminatory, and incompatible with the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and personal liberty.