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2016 Supreme(AP) 509
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
RAMESH RANGANATHAN, M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, JJ.
D. Mahesh Kumar – Appellant
Versus
State of Telangana, Department of Revenue, Rep, by its Principal Secretary & Others – Respondents
W.A. Nos. 259, 260 of 2015, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 25, 123 & 135 of 2016
Decided On : 16-11-2016
For the Appellants: P.V.A. Padmanabham, Learned Counsel, K. Vivek Reddy, Learned Special Counsel.
For the Respondent:R. Raghunandan, S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, Vedula Srinivas, C. Damodar Rao, Anand Kumar Kapoor, J. Vijaya Lakshmi, Advocates, B. Mayur Reddy, Learned Counsel.
Headnote:
Aquisition of Land - Constitution of India - Article 226,300A,14 and 226 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - section 4(1), 5(a), 6 and 11 - Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 24(1)(a) - Right to Information Act, 2005 - Sections 11, 9,48, 11-A - land acquisition proceedings were initiated in the subject areas i.e., Nampally, Begumpet and Secunderabad under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”). The section 4(1) Notification was issued on 25.04.2013, the Section 5(a) enquiry was held on 27.04.2013, and the Section 6 declaration was issued on - Notice of the award enquiry was issued - The respondents claim that the award enquiry was held, the Government granted approval under Section of the Land Acquisition Act on and the award was pronounced and it is only thereafter that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act came into force not in dispute that the notice of the award, under Section of the Act was communicated to all the petitioners only after to some to some others a few months after and to a few others more than a year or a year and a half after the Act came into force. It is only after receipt of the notices, under Section 12(2) of the Act did those whose lands were subjected to acquisition, invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article of the Constitution contending that they were entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act in view of Section 24(1)(a) thereof alternatively they were entitled to compensation under the Act in view of the proviso to Section the award was ante-dated and was made not on but on or around the date when the Section notices were issued to them - Governed by Section of the Act and the award is ante-dated. In his order dated Justice held that the awards were made, under Section of the Act prior to the commencement of the Act but were communicated after the commencement of these awards are therefore governed by the provisions of the Act consequently the land owners are not entitled for compensation under the 2013 Act - Held, Court to disregard the form and treat two laws, made by two different legislatures as one law and read them in conjunction - Sources of authority for the two statutes being different State of SCC Nair v. State of T.N. (AIR 1987 SC 2117) the legislation passed by one State Legislature cannot be equated with the legislation passed by another State Legislature - Just as laws made by one State legislature cannot be equated with legislation passed by another State Legislature, the understanding of the scope of the proviso below Section 24(2) by the Executive of other States would not require this Court to construe the Statute in tune with their understanding - We see no reason therefore to accept the submission of Learned Special Counsel that the understanding of the Executive of other States regarding the scope of the proviso - Petitioners that the proviso to Section is a substantive provision creating an independent right in favour of the land owners distinct from Section - Learned Special Counsel would submit that the proviso can be read as a substantial provision only in exceptional circumstances and in the present case there are no compelling reasons for the Court to embark on such a dangerous and extraordinary course of action - As we have held that Section and the proviso below must be read together each clause throwing light on the other it is wholly unnecessary for us to examine whether the proviso below Section can also be construed as an independent substantive provision. This contention is left open for examination if need be in appropriate legal proceedings - Writ Appeals have not been ante-dated - Appeals are accordingly disposed.
Ramesh Ranganathan, J.
1. Writ Appeal Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 25 of 2016 have been filed by the Special Deputy Collector cum Land Acquisition Officer, and the Hyderabad Metro Rail Limited, aggrieved by the Common order passed by Justice S.V. Bhatt on 02.03.2015. W.A. Nos. 22, 123 and 135 of 2016, W.A. No.259 and 260 of 2015, and cross objections in W.A. No. 22 of 2016 are preferred against the common order passed by Justice P. Naveen Rao on 20.02.2015. Parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as they were arrayed in the Writ Petitions against which these appeals have been preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
2. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that land acquisition proceedings were initiated in the subject areas i.e., Nampally, Begumpet and Secunderabad under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”). The section 4(1) Notification was issued on 25.04.2013, the Section 5(a) enquiry was held on 27.04.2013, and the Section 6 declaration was issued on 09.07.2013. Notice of the award enquiry was issued on 24.07.2013. The respondents claim that the award enquiry was held, the Government granted approval, under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the “1894 Act” for short) on 19.12.2013, and the award was pronounced on 23.12.2013, and it is only thereafter that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“the 2013 Act”) came into force on 01.01.2014. It is, however, not in dispute that the notice of the award, under Section 12(2) of the 1894 Act, was communicated to all the petitioners only after 01.01.2014, to some on 08.01.2014, to some others a few months after 01.01.2014, and to a few others more than a year or a year and a half after the 2013 Act came into force. It is only after receipt of the notices, under Section 12(2) of the 1894 Act, did those, whose lands were subjected to acquisition, invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution contending that: (a) they were entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act in view of Section 24(1)(a) thereof; (b) alternatively, they were entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act in view of the proviso to Section 24(2); and (c) the award was ante-dated and was made not on 23.12.2013, but on or around the date when the Section 12(2) notices were issued to them.
3. In his common order dated 02.03.2015, Justice S.V. Bhatt held that the awards, made prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and communicated after the 2013 Act came into force on 01.01.2014, would be governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act; and the award is ante-dated. In his order dated 20.02.2015, Justice P. Naveen Rao held that the awards were made, under Section 11 of the 1894 Act, prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, but were communicated after the commencement of the 2013 Act on 01.01.2014; these awards are, therefore, governed by the provisions of the 1894 Act; and, consequently, the land owners are not entitled for compensation under the 2013 Act. The Learned Judge further held that, if a majority of the land owners have not been paid compensation before 01.01.2014, they would then be entitled to be paid higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. After examining the records, Justice P. Naveen Rao held that the award was not ante-dated. The finding of Justice P. Naveen Rao, in his common order dated 20.02.2015, that the award is not ante-dated does not appear to have been challenged in any of the Writ Appeals, and the challenge thereto, by the petitioners, is limited to his conclusion that, since the award was made under Section 11 of the 1894 Act prior to 01.01.2014, the petitioners were not entitled for higher compensation under the 2013 Act. The Special Deputy Collector, and Land Acquisition Officer, and Hyderabad Metro Rail, have challenged the conclusion of Justice P. Naveen Rao, in his common order dated 20.02.2015, that, if a maj
